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Abstract—Designing an optimal network topology while balanc-
ing multiple, possibly conflicting objectives like cost, performance,
and resiliency to viruses is a challenging endeavor, let alone in the
case of decentralized network formation. We therefore propose a
game-formation technique where each player aims to minimize
its cost in installing links, the probability of being infected by a
virus and the sum of hopcounts on its shortest paths to all other
nodes.
In this article, we (1) determine the Nash Equilibria and the
Price of Anarchy for our novel network formation game, (2)
demonstrate that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is usually low,
which suggests that (near-)optimal topologies can be formed in
a decentralized way, and (3) give suggestions for practitioners
for those cases where the PoA is high and some centralized
control/incentives are advisable.
Keywords—Game theory; Virus spread; Network performance;
Network design; Networks of Autonomous Agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Designing communication and computer networks are com-
plex processes in which careful trade-offs have to be made
with respect to performance, resiliency/security and cost in-
vestments. For instance, if a host in a computer network
wants to route traffic to multiple other hosts, it could directly
connect to those other hosts, in this way increasing its expenses
in installing and maintaining these connections and at the
same time also becoming more susceptible to viruses from
those other hosts. In return, it would obtain a better and
faster performance with minimum delays, compared to when
it would have used intermediate hosts as relays. Although
in this example, both installation costs and risk to viruses
are increasing, they are linearly independent and they do not
necessarily optimize together. Indeed, reducing the number
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of direct connections would reduce the cost and the host
would be less vulnerable to viruses. However, even when being
connected to a few high-degree nodes with direct connections,
the host would still be seriously imposed to a virus.
In practice, hosts often are autonomous, act independently
and do not coordinate as in P2P networks [2], peering rela-
tions between Autonomous Systems [3], overlay networks [4],
wireless [5], [6], [7] and mobile [8] networks, resource sharing
in VoIP networks [9], social networks [10], [11] or the Inter-
net [12]. Their aim is to optimize their own utility functions,
which are not necessarily in accordance to the global optimum.
To study global network formation under autonomous actors,
the network formation game (NFG) framework [13] has been
proposed. However, resilience and notably virus protection
have not been taken into account in that NFG context,
even though their importance is undisputed. In this paper,
we therefore take the NFG framework one step further by
including performance and virus protection as key ingredients.
Virus propagation will be modeled by the Susceptible-Infected-
Susceptible (SIS) model [14] and we will evaluate the effect of
uncoordinated autonomous hosts versus the optimal network
topology via standard game-theoretic concepts, such as Nash
Equilibria and the Prices of Anarchy and Stability.
Our network formation game is called the Virus Spread-
Performance-Cost (VSPC) game. Each node (i.e., autonomous
player) attempts to minimize both the cost and infection proba-
bility, while still being able to route traffic to all the other nodes
in a small number of hops. When the hopcount performance
metric is irrelevant, the game is driven by the cost and virus ob-
jectives; a scenario we studied in [1]. That particular scenario
resulted in sparse graphs, which may not always represent real-
world networks, but it helped to understand the process of virus
spread better. In this paper, we generalize those results by also
including the hopcount performance metric. The probability
of the node being infected and the hopcounts to the other
nodes change in a different direction, for example adding a
link reduces the former, but increases the latter. Therefore,
there is a tradeoff in the number of added links and how
these new links are best added. Moreover, the two metrics are
linearly independent and closed-form expressions do not exist,
which makes the problem complex. Finally, the inclusion of
the hopcount allows us to better capture realistic networks. In
particular, our main contributions are the following:
• We provide a complete characterization of the various rel-
evant parameter settings and their impact on the formation
of the topologies.
• We show that depending on the input, the Nash Equi-
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2libria may vary from tree graphs, via graphs of different
diameters, to complete graphs.
• We demonstrate, both via theory and simulations, that
the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is small in most of the
cases, which implies that (near-)optimal topologies can
be formed in a decentralized non-cooperative manner. We
will also identify for which scenarios the PoA may be
high. In those cases a central point of control would be
desirable to limit/steer the players’ decisions.
This paper is organized as follows: The SIS-virus spread
model and the network-formation game model are introduced
in Section II. The Virus Spread-Performance-Cost (VSPC)
game formation is analyzed in Section III. Related work on
game formation and protection against viruses is discussed in
Section IV. The conclusion and directions for future work are
provided in Section V.
II. MODELS AND PROBLEM STATEMENTS
A. Virus-spread model
The spread of viruses in communication and computer
networks can be described, using virus-spread epidemic mod-
els [14], [15], [16]. We consider the Susceptible-Infected-
Susceptible (SIS) NIMFA model [14], [17],
dvi (t)
dt
= β (1− vi (t))
N∑
j=1
aijvj (t)− δvi (t) (1)
where N is the number of network nodes and vi(t) is the
probability of node i being infected at time t, for all i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N}. If a link is present between nodes i and j, then
aij = 1, otherwise aij = 0. In (1), a host with a virus can
infect its direct healthy neighbors with rate β, while an infected
host can be cured at rate δ, after which the node becomes
healthy, but susceptible again to the virus. The probability
vi(t) depends on the probabilities vj(t) of the neighbors j
of node i and there is no trivial closed form expression for
vi(t). The model incorporates the network topology and is
thus more realistic than the related population dynamic models.
The model relies on the network topology, which makes it
more realistic than the related population dynamic models.
The goodness of the model has been evaluated in [18]. The
probability of a node being infected in the metastable regime,
denoted by vi∞, where
dvi(t)
dt = 0 and vi∞ 6= 0, follows from
(1) as [14],
vi∞ = 1− 1
1 + τ
∑N
j=1 aijvj∞
(2)
where τ = βδ is called the effective infection rate. The epidemic
threshold τc is defined as a value of τ , such that vi∞ > 0 if τ >
τc, and otherwise vi∞ = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. The value
of vi∞ depends of the values of all vj∞ for all the neighbors
j of i, so the network topology and the interconnectivity have
impacts on vi∞s.
B. Game-formation model
In our network formation game, each player i (a node in
the network) aims to minimize its own cost function Ji, and
the social cost J is defined as J =
∑N
i=1 Ji. Specifically, the
optimal social cost is the smallest social cost over all possible
connected topologies. We look for the existence, uniqueness,
and characterization of (pure) Nash Equilibria1. The Price of
Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS) are defined as
the ratio of social cost in the worst-case Nash Equilibrium (the
one with highest social cost) and the optimal social cost, and
the ratio of the social cost in the best-case Nash Equilibrium
(the one with lowest social cost) and the optimal social cost,
respectively:
PoA =
J(worst NE)
min J
, PoS =
J(best NE)
min J
. (3)
PoA is an efficiency measure, illustrating how bad selfish
playing is, in comparison to the global optimum. PoS, on the
other hand, reflects the best possible performance without co-
ordination in comparison to the global optimum. The network
about to be designed, is empty and every node in the network is
a player. We assume the cost of building one (communication)
link between two nodes is fixed. Every player i can install a
link from itself to another node j. Installing a link between i
and j means that both i and j can utilize it, but only one pays
for the cost, like often assumed in NFG models [12], [19],
[4]. Several examples fit this scenario: (i) a friend request is
initiated by one node in a social network, but both read the
posts from one another; (ii) a new road connecting two cities
is built by one city in a road network, but both utilize it; and
(iii) in a hand-shake protocol in a computer network one node
initiates a connection used by two nodes.
We consider a Virus Spread-Performance-Cost (VSPC)
network formation game, where player i aims to reduce its cost
and the probability vi∞ of being infected, but concurrently also
wants to improve its performance by shortening the hopcounts
h(i, j) of the shortest paths to all the other nodes j. The cost
function of player i that unites these objectives is given by:
Ji = α · ki + γ
N∑
j=1
h(i, j) + vi∞. (4)
Function Ji involves the cost ki of installing all the links from
node i, weighted by a coefficient α. The hopcounts h(i, j) are
weighted by γ. Opposing goals meet in this game: the more
links are installed, the shorter the paths, but the higher the
probability of being infected and the higher the cost.
The social cost J for the whole network is a weighted sum
over all nodes
J =
N∑
i=1
Ji = αL+ γ
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
h(i, j) +
N∑
i=1
vi∞, (5)
where L denotes the number of links.
III. VIRUS SPREAD-PERFORMANCE-COST (VSPC) GAME
A. Optimal social cost, Nash Equilibria and the PoA for γ →
0
In order to understand the effect of the virus protection, we
start by setting γ to an infinitely small number (approaching
1A Nash Equilibrium is the state of the players’ network strategies, where
none of the players can reduce its cost by unilaterally changing its strategy.
3zero2). As a result, the hopcounts are of no influence anymore,
while network connectivity is still guaranteed (the hopcount
between two disconnected nodes is assumed to be infinity).
Lemma 1 limits the possible Nash Equilibria.
Lemma 1. The probability vi∞(G) of node i being infected
in the metastable state in network G does not exceed the prob-
ability vi∞(G+ l) of node i being infected in the metastable
state in network G+ l obtained by adding a link l to G.
Proof: The newly added link l = (a, b) is between nodes
a and b. We make use of the canonical infinite form [14],
vi∞ = 1− 1
1 + τdi − τ∑Nj=1 aij1+τdj−τ∑Nk=1 ajk
1+τdk−
. . .
. (6)
After the addition of link l = (a, b), the expression (6) for
vi∞(G + l) has all the terms the same as in vi∞(G), except
the following differences: da → da + 1; db → db + 1 and
the presence of the adjacency entry aab = 0 → aab = 1 in
the canonical representation. The last statement implies that
its contribution is a part that is the same as in vi∞(G) until
it “reaches” nodes a or b, where the expression (at a certain
depth of the canonical form) is:
τ(da + 1)− τ
τ(db + 1)− . . .
+ U = τda + U + τ(1− 1
τ(db + 1)− . . .
),
(7)
where da and db are the degrees of a and b in G, while U
is the remaining part in the canonical form. In (7), the term
τ(1− 1τ(db+1)−... ) is positive and U increases with da and db.
U increases with da and db as it is also an infinite canonical
form with any of these two variables being in the numerator
or in the denominator with a negative sign in front, in the
same way as explained in the lines above - repeating infinitely
many times. Therefore, the whole term in (7) increases, which
implies that vi∞(G + l) > vi∞(G) also increases for each
node i.
We start by looking into the possible Nash Equilibria.
Theorem 1. If a Nash Equilibrium is reached, then the
constructed graph is a tree.
Proof: If G is connected and each node can reach every
other node, then changing the strategy of node i from the
current one to investing in an extra link, will increase both
its cost (by 1, scaled by α) and vi∞ (by Lemma 1). Hence,
unilaterally investing in an extra link is not beneficial for a
node.
We now assume that G is not a tree. Then, there is at least
one cycle in this graph. If a node i in that cycle changes its
strategy from investing in a link in that cycle to not investing,
the cost is decreased by 1 (weighted by α) and all the other
nodes in the graph are still reachable from i. Moreover, by
not investing in that link, node i decreases its probability
vi∞ of being infected in the metastable state, according to
2The case of γ = 0 is either trivial or debatable. By neglecting the
hopcounts, the optimal topology would be the (non-realistic) empty graph
with no links (cost) and no epidemic to be propagated. Moreover, infinite
hopcounts will be multiplied by γ = 0 which is undefined.
Lemma 1. Hence, by unilaterally changing its strategy, node i
decreases its cost utility Ji, which is in contradiction with a
Nash Equilibrium.
Observation 1. A Nash Equilibrium is achieved for both the
star graph and the path graph, but not all trees are Nash
Equilibria.
Proof: Let us consider a star graph, where all the links
are installed by the root node as shown in Fig. 1a. (A link
is installed and paid for by the node marked with p.) The
root node cannot unilaterally decrease its cost, because cutting
at least one of its installed links would disconnect it, while
installing a link from a leaf node i would increase both ki and
vi∞ (Lemma 1). Hence, the star graph is a Nash Equilibrium.
Let us now assume that a path graph (Fig. 1b) is constructed,
such that (N − 1) nodes invest in exactly one link and one of
the leaves does not invest in installing a link. Similarly as for
a star graph, none of the nodes can unilaterally decrease their
cost by just installing extra links or cutting some of them. A
”re-wiring”3 from one of the nodes by re-directing its installed
links to another node may be in order. In such a case, if node
i “re-wires” its installed link to another node, then Ji would
not decrease. 1) If it is installed to one of the leaves, such
that the graph is connected, we end up with an isomorphic
graph, where the position of i is the same as in the initial
graph, so Ji stays the same. 2) If i ”re-wires” to one of the
other nodes j (w.l.o.g., i < j) as visualized in Fig. 1e, i would
have the same degree, but its “new neighbor” would have a
degree 3 instead of 2. The degree of j increases by 1 to 3 and
the degree of (i + 1) decreases by 1 to 1 (node (i + 1) will
become terminal and ”far” from i), while all the other degrees
remain the same. Moreover, i would be equally close to any
of the nodes “behind” {1, . . . , i − 1}, closer to the nodes “at
the end” {j+1, . . . , N} and equally close to the nodes in the
set {i+1, . . . , j−1}, but just in a reverse order. Based on the
canonical infinite form (6), vi∞ would increase4. Therefore,
the path graph is also a Nash Equilibrium.
There are also other trees that are Nash Equilibria (e.g.,
T ′ given in Fig. 1c). Moreover, there are values of τ such
that worst- and best-case Nash Equilibria are achieved for
trees different from star K1,N−1 and path PN graphs. For
τ ∈ [1.475, 1.589], tree T ′ is the best-case Nash Equilibrium
and has optimal social cost.
However, not all the trees are Nash Equilibria. For example,
the tree given in Fig. 1d. Here, whomever pays for the “central”
link between a and b, can reduce its cost utility by “re-wiring”
to c or d.
We proceed by characterizing the worst- and best-case Nash
Equilibria.
Theorem 2. For sufficiently high effective infection rate τ ,
the optimal social cost and the best-case Nash Equilibrium
are achieved by the star graph K1,N−1, while the worst-case
3”Re-wiring” is a process of removing a link to node k initiated by node i
and establishing a new link to another node j. The degree of node i does not
change, while the degrees of k and j are decreased and increased, respectively.
4vi∞ in (6) would have bigger values by having nodes with ”bigger
degrees” as as close as possible (i.e. in fewer hops) to the node.
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(e) Re-wiring increases vi∞.
Fig. 1: A link is installed by the end-node marked with p. Trees in (a), (b), and (c) are Nash Equilibria. (d) Tree T ′′ cannot be
a Nash Equilibrium.
Nash Equilibrium is achieved for the path graph PN ,
J(K1,N−1) ≤ J ≤ J(PN ).
Proof: According to Theorem 1, in a Nash Equilibrium
the graph is a tree, hence it has N −1 links. In a general case,
from a tree in which there are two nodes i and k, connected
to one another, for which di ≥ 3 and dk = 1 (i.e. k is a leaf),
by breaking the connection between i and k and connecting
k to another leaf j instead, we have: the degree of k is 1
(remains the same); the degree of node i becomes di − 1 ≥ 2
(decreased by one); and the degree of j is 2 (increased by
one). The process can be repeated until there exists a node of
degree at least 3 in the tree. At the end, we end up with a tree
with no degree bigger than 2 and this is a path PN . The social
cost J is increased in each step [1, Lemma 2]. In this way, the
process converges to a path PN .
In a very similar (but reverse) process, starting from any
tree G, we can decrease J at each step, ending up with a star
K1,N−1 with a maximum J(G) in the final step.
However, what would be the optimal social cost, and the
worst- and best-case Nash Equilibria highly depends on the
effective infection rate τ .
Theorem 3. For low values of the effective infection rate τ ,
above but sufficiently close to the epidemic threshold τc, the
optimal social cost and the best-case Nash Equilibrium are
achieved by the path graph PN , while the worst-case Nash
Equilibrium is achieved by the star graph K1,N−1,
J(PN ) ≤ J ≤ J(K1,N−1).
Proof: We consider a spectral approach [20] and denote
y(τ) =
N∑
i=1
vi∞(τ) the infection probability of all nodes in
the metastable state. The probabilities of a node in the graph
being infected are non-zero and y(τ) > 0 if τ > τc = 1λ1 ,
where λ1 is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix in
the graph [16]. For τ < 1λ1 , y(τ) = 0.
Lova´sz and Pelika´n [21] ordered all the trees with N
nodes by the largest eigenvalues of the adjacency matrices.
It turns out that, the path PN and star K1,N−1 are the trees
with the minimum λ1(PN ) and maximum λ1(K1,N−1) largest
eigenvalues, respectively.
For values τ = 1λ1(K1,N−1) + ε =
1√
N−1 + ε, it holds that
yK1,N−1(τ) > yT (τ) = 0, where T is any tree different from
K1,N−1, therefore J(K1,N−1) is the largest.
For values τ = 1λ1(PN ) − ε = 12 cos( piN+1 ) − ε, we have
yT (τ) > yPN (τ) = 0, where T is any tree different from PN ,
hence J(PN ) is the smallest.
Theorems 2 and 3 show opposite behavior depending on
whether the value τ is in the high or low regime, although
both revolve around the path and star graphs. For τ in the
intermediate regime, different trees may give the best-/worst-
case Nash Equilibrium.
Corollary 1. For both high and low effective infection rate τ ,
PoS = 1 and
PoA = max
{ J(PN )
J(K1,N−1)
,
J(K1,N−1)
J(PN )
}
.
Proof: Based on Theorems 2 and 3, for high (low) τ ,
tree K1,N−1 (PN ) is both optimal in social cost and the best-
case Nash Equilibrium, while PN (K1,N−1) is the worst-case
Nash Equilibrium. Based on the definitions for PoS and PoA in
(3), PoS = J(K1,N−1)J(K1,N−1) = 1(=
J(PN )
J(PN )
); and PoA= J(PN )J(K1,N−1)
for large enough τ and PoA= J(K1,N−1)J(PN ) for τ close to the
epidemic threshold τc.
Corollary 2. For sufficiently high effective infection rate τ , in
the virus spread-cost game formation,
PoA < 1 +
1
2
(
τ(α+ 1)− 1) , where τ(α+ 1) > 1.
Proof: The proof is provided in [1].
The exact value of the PoA is given in Fig. 2 by making
use of Corollary 1. It is highest (∼ 3.3) for small τ , above the
epidemic threshold and it further sharply decreases reaching 1
for a unique Nash Equilibrium. For higher τ , the PoA increases
towards its maximum around 1.1 and then it slowly decreases
approaching 1.
We have observed that the equilibria tree topology in which
a virus thrives is not always a star (i.e., the tree with the
smallest diameter), but that it may differ with the virus
infection rate. For most of the τ values (except maybe small
τ ), a small value for the Price of Anarchy (PoA) means that a
topology close to optimal can be obtained in a decentralized
manner, even when the individual players play selfishly.
B. Optimal social cost, Nash Equilibria and the PoA for γ > 0
We start by analyzing the social cost (5). Node i is one
hop away from its di neighboring nodes, while it is at
least 2 hops away from the other N − 1 − di nodes, hence
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Fig. 2: The Price of Anarchy (PoA). The dotted lines represent
the bound from Corollary 2.
∑N
j=1 h(i, j) ≥ di+2(N−1−di). Using this, for large enough
τ when
∑N
i=1 vi∞ can be approximated
5 by using truncation
of Maclaurin seria [17, Lemma 1], the social cost in (5) is
lower bounded as
J ≥ N + 2γN(N − 1) + (α− 2γ)L− 1
τ
N∑
i=1
1
di
. (8)
The following bound is due to Cioaba˘ [22, Theorem 9],
N∑
i=1
1
di
≤ N
2
2L
+ (
1
dmin
− 1
dmax
)(N − 1− 2L
N
),
where the equality holds for regular graphs and the star graph.
Based on this, dmin ≥ 1, and dmax ≤ N − 1, we obtain
N∑
i=1
1
di
≤ N
2
2L
+ (1− 1
N − 1)(N − 1−
2L
N
)
=
N2
2L
+
N − 2
N(N − 1) (N(N − 1)− 2L). (9)
Equality in (9) is achieved only for the star K1,N−1, where
dmax = N − 1 and dmin = 1, or for the complete graph KN
5In fact, the sum can be lower bounded [14, p. 10] by
∑N
i=1 vi∞ >
N −∑Ni=1 11+(τ−1)di , which is meaningful for τ > 1.
(where 2L = N(N−1)). (The equality for other regular graphs
is ruled out because of the inequality in (9).) Using (9) into
(8) yields
J ≥ N + 2γN(N − 1)− N − 2
τ
+ (α− 2γ + 2(N − 2)
τN(N − 1) )L−
N2
2τL
(10)
Let us consider two regimes:
1) If α − 2γ + 2(N−2)τN(N−1) ≥ 0, then the bound in (10) is an
increasing function in L, hence the optimal social cost
is achieved for L = N − 1. The bound in (10) is tight
for such L, because the bounds in (9) and (8) become
equalities for K1,N−1 and any graph with a diameter
at most two, respectively. Hence, J ≥ J(K1,N−1) and
equality is achieved only for the star graph K1,N−1.
2) If α − 2γ + 2(N−2)τN(N−1) < 0, then the bound in (10)
increases for L < N√
2τ(2γ−α)− 4(N−2)
N(N−1) )
and decreases for
L > N√
2τ(2γ−α)− 4(N−2)
N(N−1) )
. Hence, the optimal social cost
is achieved in one of two boundary cases: L = N − 1
and L =
(
N
2
)
. For L = N − 1, similarly as in 1), we
obtain that the only possibility is the star graph K1,N−1,
while for L =
(
N
2
)
it is the complete graph KN . Finally,
J ≥ min{J(K1,N−1), J(KN )}.
It remains to compare J(K1,N−1) and J(KN ):
J(K1,N−1) = N + α(N − 1) + 2γ(N − 1)2 − (N−1)
2+1
τ(N−1)
and J(KN ) = N + α
N(N−1)
2 + γN(N − 1) − Nτ(N−1) .
Hence,
J(KN )− J(K1,N−1) = (N − 1)(N − 2)(α
2
− γ + 1
τ(N − 1) ).
If α ≤ 2γ − 2τ(N−1) , then J(KN ) ≤ J(K1,N−1) and the
optimal social cost is achieved for the complete graph
KN . If α ≥ 2γ − 2τ(N−1) , then J(KN ) ≥ J(K1,N−1)
and the optimal social cost is achieved for the star
graph K1,N−1. The last also covers case 1), because
2γ − 2τ(N−1) < 2γ − 2(N−2)τN(N−1) .
Now, for the optimal social cost, Theorem 4 follows.
Theorem 4. For sufficiently high τ , the optimal social cost is
achieved for the star K1,N−1 if α ≥ 2γ− 2τ(N−1) , and for the
complete graph KN , otherwise.
We proceed with characterization of the Nash Equilibria and
the Price of Anarchy for sufficiently high τ . In the VSPC
game, Nash Equilibria topologies can be complex, while the
star and the complete graph can appear as extreme cases:
• The complete graph KN is a Nash Equilibrium, if and
only if α ≤ γ− 1τ(N−1) . Since new links cannot be added,
changing the strategy for a node i means deleting k of its
links (1 ≤ k ≤ N − 2). The corresponding change would
increase the cost Ji of i by k(γ − α) − 1τ(N−1−k) +
1
τ(N−1) = k(γ − α) − kτ(N−1)(N−1−k) ≥ kτ(N−1) (1 −
1
N−1−k ) ≥ 0. Hence, node i has no interest to deviate
from its current strategy. On the other hand, if α > γ −
1
τ(N−1) and node i changes its strategy by cutting (N−2)
6links (all except one - to keep its connectivity), the change
in Ji is equal to (N − 2)(γ − α − 1τ(N−1) ) < 0, which
will reduce its cost.
• The star graph K1,N−1 is a Nash Equilibrium, if and only
if α ≥ γ − 1τ(N−1) . The root node cannot delete a link,
because this would make its cost infinity. If i is a leaf,
for some k ≥ 0, changing its strategy means: (i) adding
k links, then the hopcounts to these nodes are reduced
from 2 to 1, hence the contribution from the hopcounts is
changed by −kγ; or (ii) deleting the link installed by him
(if any) and installing (k+1) links, where k+1 < N−2.
In (ii), the hopcount to the root node is increased from 1
to 2, the hopcount to (k + 1) links is decreased from 2
to 1, and the hopcounts to the other
(
(N − 2)− (k+1))
nodes are increased from 2 to 3. The change in the sum
of hopcounts is: −(k+1)γ+1·γ+((N−2)−(k+1))γ =
−kγ + ((N − 2)− (k + 1))γ ≥ −kγ, hence the change
of the hopcount is again at least −kγ. Thus, the change
in Ji is at least kα − kγ − 1τ(k+1) + 1τ = k(α − γ +
1
τ(k+1) ) ≥ k(α − γ + 1τ(N−1) ) ≥ 0. On the other hand,
if α < γ − 1τ(N−1) , the change in Ji by adding (N − 2)
links from one leaf to all the other leaves in K1,N−1, is
(N−2)(α−γ)− 1τ(N−1)+ 1τ = (N−2)(α−γ+ 1τ(N−1) ) <
0, i.e. it is not a Nash Equilibrium.
The above two points resolves the conditions for two specific
graphs, but they do not cover all the possibilities for the
Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy, which may vary
on different intervals and a case analysis, as provided in the
following, is required. We will consider the case α < 2γ − 1τ
and the case α > 2γ − 1τ .
Case α < 2γ − 1τ .
Now, γ > 12τ . A Nash Equilibrium is achieved only for
graphs with a diameter at most 2 - an argument used in the later
points (b) and (c). The proof is by contradiction. Let us assume
node i is at least 3 hops away from another node. Clearly,
di ≤ (N−2) and if i installs a link from i to j, the difference in
Ji is at least α−2γ+ 1τdi(di+1) ≤ − 1τ + 1τdi(di+1) < 0. Hence,
i reduces its cost and the graph is not a Nash Equilibrium. We
consider three sub-intervals (a), (b) and (c):
(a) If α < γ − 12τ , adding a link from i will change Ji by at
least α−γ+ 1τdi(di+1) < − 12τ + 1τdi(di+1) ≤ 0. Therefore, the
complete graph KN is the only Nash Equilibrium. Because,
α < γ − 12τ ≤ 2γ − 2τ(N−1) for N ≥ 3 and, according to
Theorem 4, it also has optimal social cost. Finally, PoA =
PoS = 1.
(b) If γ − 12τ ≤ α ≤ γ − 1τ(N−1) and we assume, by
contradiction, that there is a Nash Equilibrium different from
KN , we have the following:
• If there is a link in the graph, installed by node i such
that its deletion increases the sum of hopcounts from i by
only 1, then Ji is increased by: γ − α − 1τdi(di−1) > 0.
On the other hand, adding a link would change Ji to:
α − γ + 1τdi(di+1) > 0. The last two inequalities imply,
0 < α − γ + 1τdi(di+1) < − 1τdi(di−1) + 1τdi(di+1) =
− 2τ(di−1)di(di+1) < 0, which is a contradiction. Hence,
there is no other Nash Equilibrium different from KN
and PoA = PoS = 1.
• If deleting any of the links installed by i would increase
the sum of hopcounts by at least 2; by link deletion, the
difference in Ji is at least 2γ − α − 1τdi(di−1) and we
have 2γ − α − 1τdi(di−1) ≥ γ + 1τ(N−1) − 1τdi(di−1) ≥
1
2τ − 1τdi(di−1) + 1τ(N−1) ≥ 1τ(N−1) > 0. We proceed
by considering the properties of the possible Nash Equi-
libria in particular sub-intervals: − 1τ(k−1)k ≤ α − γ <
− 1τk(k+1) for k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , b
√
N − 34 − 12c}. By link
addition, the difference in Ji is α− γ + 1τdi(di+1) and a
necessary condition for a Nash Equilibrium is di < k.
On the other hand, k ≤
√
N − 34 − 12 ≤
√
N − 1,
hence di <
√
N − 1. Therefore, we have less than√
N − 1 nodes that are on a distance 1 from a node i.
Each of these nodes is directly connected by less than√
N − 1 − 1 nodes different from i. Hence, there less
than
√
N − 1 + √N − 1(√N − 1 − 1) = N − 1 nodes
that are at most 2 hops from i, hence at least one node
that is more than 2 hops away from i, a contradiction
to the general claim (before (a))! Hence, KN is the only
Nash Equilibrium and PoA = PoS = 1.
(c) If γ − 1τ(N−1) ≤ α < 2γ − 1τ , then K1,N−1 is a Nash
Equilibrium. Graphs that are of diameter at most 2 are also
candidates for a Nash Equilibrium.
Because the diameter of the graph is not bigger than 2, (8)
becomes an equality J = N + 2γN(N − 1) + (α − 2γ)L −
1
τ
∑N
i=1
1
di
for sufficiently large τ . Applying the condition of
(c) leads to
J(worst NE) < N + 2γN(N − 1)− 1
τ
L− 1
τ
N∑
i=1
1
di
= N + 2γN(N − 1)− 1
τ
N∑
i=1
(
di
2
+
1
di
)
≤ N + 2γN(N − 1)− 3N
2τ
= N(1 + 2γ(N − 1)− 3
2τ
)
(11)
due to the fact that di2 +
1
di
≥ 32 (equivalent to (di−1)(di−2) ≥
0). Equality holds (only) in the last line of (11) if di = 1 or
di = 2 for all i (e.g., the ring CN or the path PN graphs),
otherwise a strict inequality in the second part also holds.
Finally, knowing that the optimal social cost is attained by the
complete graph KN and the condition inequality condition in
(c) for J(KN ): PoA =
J(worst NE)
J(KN )
<
1+2γ(N−1)− 32τ
1+
3γ(N−1)
2 − 12τ− 1τ(N−1)
=
4
3 (1+
3γ(N−1)
2 − 12τ− 1τ(N−1) )−( 13+ 56τ− 43τ(N−1) )
1+
3γ(N−1)
2 − 12τ− 1τ(N−1)
≤
4
3 (1+
3γ(N−1)
2 − 12τ− 1τ(N−1) )
1+
3γ(N−1)
2 − 12τ− 1τ(N−1)
= 43 for each N ≥ 3; because
1
3+
5
6τ − 43τ(N−1) > 0. This bound is approached, for instance,
when α and γ are large and bigger than τ : KN is the social
optimum and K1,N is the worst-case Nash Equilibrium and
the bounds in (11) and the inequality for PoA are closely ap-
proached. If α < γ− 1τ(N−1)(N−2) , KN is a Nash Equilibrium
and PoS = 1, otherwise PoS > 1.
7Case α > 2γ − 1τ .
We first consider the links, whose deletion leaves the graph
connected. For any node i, we focus on the links installed by
i. Let l = (i, j) be one such link and the number of all nodes
q that use l as a link for the shortest paths from j to q is z.
According to Schoone et al. [23, Theorem 2.1., case k = 1],
all the distances from i to the other nodes are increased by at
most 2d, where d is the diameter in the original graph. In a
Nash Equilibrium, 2dzγ −α− 1τdi(di−1) > 0 for any possible
value of di ≥ 2, i.e. we obtain 2dzγ − α − 12τ > 0. Hence,
z >
α+ 12τ
2dγ and then the number of such links to node j is
not bigger than 2dγN
α+ 12τ
. Taking into account all possible nodes,
the number of links whose deletion does not disconnect the
graph is not bigger than 2dγN
2
α+ 12τ
. On the other hand there are
at most (N − 1) links such that a removal of any of those
links disconnects the graph. Indeed, a connected graph has a
spanning tree T and a link removed from T disconnects the
graph, while a removal of a link that is not in T leaves the
graph connected. Therefore,
L ≤ N − 1 + 2dγN
2
α+ 1
2τ
(12)
If two nodes i and j are a hops apart from each other, adding
a link from i to j would reduce the hopcounts from i to all
the nodes in the “second half” along the previous path to j by
at least half of their lengths, by a− 1, a− 3, . . . , 1 for a even
or by a− 1, a− 3, . . . , 2 for a odd. Hence, the total reduction
in the sum of shortest paths from i is
∑ a
2
i=1(2i− 1) = a
2
4 or∑ a−1
2
i=1 (2i) =
a2−1
4 for a even or odd, respectively. Assuming
a Nash Equilibrium and i is a starting node on the diameter,
considering the change in cost Ji, the following inequality
would hold for any d: α − d2−14 γ + 1τdi(di+1) > 0. Using
di ≥ 1, and the absolute maximum for d being N − 1, we
arrive at
d < min{
√
1 +
4
γ
(α+
1
2τ
), N} (13)
Each node i has at least one neighbor and all the others are no
more than d hops apart, hence:
∑N
j=1 h(i, j) ≤ 1+ (N − 1)d.
Applying the arithmetic-harmonic mean inequality leads to
1
τ
∑N
i=1
1
di
≥ 1τ N
2∑N
i=1 di
= N
2
2Lτ . We proceed by upper bound-
ing J in (8),
J ≤ N + αL+ γN(1 + (N − 1)d)− N
2
2Lτ
(14)
Applying (12) modifies (14), into
J ≤N + α(N − 1) + γN +N((N − 1) + 2αN
α+ 1
2τ
)
γd
− N
2
2τ(N − 1 + 2dγN2
α+ 1
2τ
)
(15)
We distinguish two sub-cases, (a) and (b):
(a) If α ≥ 2γ − 2τ(N−1) , then the optimal social cost (and
a Nash Equilibrium) is achieved for the star graph K1,N−1,
hence PoS=1. Now, using (15) for PoA,
PoA ≤ N + αL+ γN(1 + (N − 1)d)−
N2
2Lτ
N + α(N − 1) + 2γ(N − 1)2 − (N−1)2+1
τ(N−1)
(16)
and applying (12),
PoA ≤
N + α(N − 1) +Nγ +Nγ(N − 1 + 2αN
α+ 1
2τ
)d− N2
2τ(N−1+ 2dγN2
α+ 1
2τ
)
N + α(N − 1) + 2γ(N − 1)2 − (N−1)2+1
τ(N−1)
(17)
• γ · d is not infinitesimally small. For sufficiently large6
N , after some algebraic transformation, division by N2 in
both the numerator and denominator of (17) and applying
(12),
PoA ≤O((1
2
+
α
α+ 1
2τ
)
√
1 +
4
γ
(α+
1
2τ
)
)
(18)
• γ · d is infinitesimally small. According to (12), L =
O(N). Now, (16) yields
PoA ≤O
( N + αL− N2
2Lτ
N + α(N − 1)− (N−1)2+1
τ(N−1)
)
(19)
(b) If 2γ − 2τ(N−1) ≥ α ≥ 2γ − 1τ , then the optimal social
cost is achieved for the complete graph KN , and using (15),
PoA ≤ N+αL+γN(1+(N−1)d)− N
2
2Lτ
N+α
N(N−1)
2 +γN(N−1)− Nτ(N−1)
. Now,
• γ ·d is not infinitesimally small. Using the bound for L in
(12), for sufficiently high enough6 N , (17) is transformed
into PoA ≤ O
(
2
√
γ2+4γ(α+ 12τ )
α+2γ (1+
2α
α+ 12τ
)
)
and we have
a constant value for PoA.
• γ · d is infinitesimally small. Then α is small and PoA
has a value close to 1.
Based on these results, we present Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. For sufficiently high τ in the VSPC game, the
PoA depends on the parameters α, γ and τ ,
1) if α ≥ 2γ − 2τ(N−1) , then PoS=1 and if
• γd is not small, then
PoA ≤ O(( 12 + αα+ 12τ )√1 + 4γ (α+ 12τ )).• γ · d is small, then PoA is given by Corollary 1.
2) if 2γ − 2τ(N−1) ≥ α ≥ 2γ − 1τ and
• γd is not small, then
PoA ≤ O
(
2
√
γ2+4γ(α+ 12τ )
α+2γ (1 +
2α
α+ 12τ
)
)
.
• γ ·d (and γ) is small, then α is also small and we have
a constant value for PoA close to 1.
3) if 2γ− 1τ > α ≥ γ− 1τ(N−1) , then Nash Equilibria graphs
have diameters at most two and PoS ≤ PoA < 43 .
4) if γ− 1τ(N−1) > α, then KN is the only Nash Equilibrium
and PoA = PoS = 1.
Theorem 5 and Corollaries 1 and 2 are compatible for small γ.
6Significantly larger compared to the coefficients α, γ and τ .
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Fig. 3: Simulation results of the heuristic algorithm for the obtained networks in a Nash Equilibrium. The three regimes big,
moderate and small τ are represented with values 5.2, 1.4 and 1, respectively. The number of nodes is N = 10.
C. Computational aspects and simulations
Since, (i) for small τ below the epidemic threshold τc,
vi∞ = 0 and (ii) for τ =∞, vi∞ = 1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N},
the problem of finding a best response in the VSPC game
includes the best-response problem described in [12], which is
NP-hard. We therefore use a best-response heuristic algorithm,
as in [4]. The steps of the algorithm are the following:
1) We start with an initial random graph G = G11.
2) Time t is slotted and the first time slot is t = 1.
3) Each node takes only two actions at each time slot t.
We fix the order of actions from node 1 to node N . The
possible actions for each node are: dropping a link (D);
adding a link (A); or doing nothing (N).
4) We denote by Git the graph at time t before the action of
node i.
5) Starting from node 1, each node i first computes the
maximum reduction of its cost Ji induced by dropping
a link (D) from graph Git, or takes action (N) if no
9reduction could be realized. Taking the obtained graph,
node i computes the maximum reduction of its cost Ji
induced by adding a link (A), or takes action (N) if no
reduction could be realized.
6) After the decision of node i at time t, the graph becomes
Gi+1t . After the decision of node N , the algorithm moves
to time t+ 1 (i.e., to graph G1t+1).
7) An equilibrium is reached at time t when all the nodes
take the action (N) or the algorithm stops after a certain
number of iterations tmax is reached.
In Fig. 3, results are given for the Price of Anarchy (PoA),
the average number of links and the average hopcount as a
function of installation cost α for different effective infection
rates τ (namely big, moderate and small τ with values 5.2,
1.4 and 1, respectively that well represents the 3 regimes)
and different weights (costs) for the hopcounts γ in a graph
with N = 10 nodes. We also display some typical outcomes
of the algorithm for different values of α and τ and three
different values of γ in Fig. 4, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 (see the
visualizations at the end of the paper, after the bibliography).
For all the metrics shown in Fig. 3, there is an interesting
behavior for the curve with “no virus,” in the sense that it
follows the same shape as the curves where the virus is present,
but is often shifted/delayed from them. This is due to the
”enhancing” effect from the virus spread on the installation
cost contribution.
For small values of α, due to the resulting cheap installation
cost, and for non-negligible performance values γ, the Nash
Equilibrium is a very dense graph, often the complete graph
KN , for all τ (Fig. 4). This reflects case 4) in Theorem 5,
although the interval for α, where KN is the only Nash
Equilibrium would shrink (and may vanish) for small γ (Fig. 5
and Fig. 6). In the latter case, the corresponding PoAs in
Fig. 3g and Fig. 2 have comparable shapes and the obtained
topologies are trees (see Fig. 3h), although not necessarily star
graphs (see Fig. 6).
Because of the higher installation cost (higher α) in intervals
3) and 2) from Theorem 5, the Nash Equilibria topologies
are sparse: (i) in particular non-tree networks for γ = 5
(constant average number of links and sum of hopcounts) and
mostly trees for γ equal to 1 or 0.1. Consequently, the PoA
linearly decreases with α on this interval. For the interval 1) in
Theorem 5 (high installation cost), the PoA increases with α
(and τ ), reaching a local maximum and then have a different
behavior for larger α. Namely, it decreases towards 1 for small
γ, while it is unpredictable for higher γ (the left column,
subfigures (a), (d) and (g), in Fig. 3). But most importantly
the effect of the epidemics part is noticeable and higher τ
introduces inefficiency, which is reflected by a high PoA. It
is also important to note that for comparable α and γ, the
algorithm displays somewhat fluctuating behavior in terms of
PoA (middle row of Fig. 3) due to the heuristic nature of the
algorithm.
Being able to detect the intervals with high PoA, as we
have done in this section, means that for those intervals
some coordination/incentives of and for the players is needed.
Since the PoS is generally low, in the best case with Nash
Equilibrium a small amount of coordination likely suffices. For
the intervals where the PoA is low, the selfish behavior of the
players might still lead to (near)-optimal topologies without
any coordination.
IV. RELATED WORK
Virus spread in networks has been thoroughly explored
during the last decades [14], [15], [16], [17], [24]. These
works involve studies ranging from virus-spread propagation,
the computation of the number of infected hosts [14] to the
epidemic threshold [15] in various epidemic models on net-
works. There is a large body of literature on game formation,
that mostly minimizes a cost utility based on hopcount and
the cost for installing links [12], [3], [19], [4], [25], [26], [27].
Fabrikant et al. [12] have studied the case, where a node’s
utility is a weighted sum of the installed links and the sum
of hopcounts from each node in an undirected graph. The
follow up work by Albers et al. [19] resolved some open
questions from [12]. Chun et al. [4] have conducted extensive
simulations on the same type of game formation. A game
formation problem involving hopcounts and costs, applied to
P2P networks has been considered by Moscibroda et al. [25].
Meirom et al. [28], [29] have provided dynamic and data
analyses (apart from their static analysis) in an NFG setting
with heterogenous players and robustness objectives. Nahir et
al. [27] have considered similar NFG problems in directed
graphs. A coalition and bilateral agreements between players
in NFG and game-theory, in general, have been considered
in [30], [8], [31], [3]. In order to evaluate “the goodness” of
the equilibria, the prices of anarchy and stability [26], [32]
have been used.
In this work, we have considered virus protection aspects
together with cost and the length of shortest paths. In this
sense, our work extends (with virus spread) and generalizes
the related work [12], [19], [27]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, network formation games concerning virus
spread and protection both with or without the performance
aspects have not been considered in the NFG framework,
although security games [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38]
have been used in modeling the virus spread suppression and
network immunization. Performance aspects, represented by
the hopcounts are linearly independent from the resilience
to virus spread– the two metrics do not possess closed-form
expressions– making the NFG problem challenging, apart from
the novelty.
V. CONCLUSION
We have considered a novel network formation game (NFG),
called the virus spread-performance-cost (VSPC) game, for
communication networks in which the aspects link installation
costs, virus infection probability, and performance in terms
of the number of hops needed to reach other nodes in the
network, all need to be balanced. We have characterized the
Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) for various
cases. In most of the cases, the PoA is not high, often close to
1, which implies that the decisions of non-cooperative players
would lead, in a decentralized way, to an optimal topology.
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When the aspect of the shortest hopcounts is not important,
we have found that only trees (but not all) could be Nash
Equilibria. In that case, surprisingly, a path graph is the worst-
and the star graph is the best-case Nash Equilibrium for big
virus infection rate τ , while it is the opposite for small τ . For
intermediate values of τ , other trees are optimal. The PoA is
the highest for values of τ just above the epidemic threshold.
However, the PoA is generally small and close to 1, does not
depend on the number of players, and is inversely proportional
to τ and the installation cost α.
When the hopcounts do matter, the Nash Equilibria might
be formed by more complex topologies. The PoA highly
depends on τ , the installation links and hopcount costs α
and γ, respectively, as shown by both theory and simulation.
Although the PoA is small for most of the cases, for some
intervals of those parameters, the PoA could be high. Hence,
a central control and regulatory mechanism should be in place
in such cases. Being able to detect those intervals, as we have
done, helps in the design of optimal, efficient, virus-free and
cheap overlay, P2P or wireless networks by limiting the non-
cooperative freedom of the hosts’ decisions.
There are several possibilities for follow-up work, such as a
study on mixed Equilibria, player coalitions, inhomogeneous
costs, or time-varying networks.
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